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ABSTRACT 
This paper is devoted to better understanding of the Brazilian agricultural national policies towards 
domestic support and implications related to WTO rules. Domestic support has taken central stage in the 
last years and in light of a global economic crisis will play an even greater role in international trade 
politics. The paper focuses on Brazil and lays out the different domestic support policies used by the 
government. It is divided into five distinct parts for better comprehension. These parts are as follow: a 
synopsis of policies and recent studies; replication of official WTO support notifications; construction of 
consistent shadow notification; comparison and discussion of shadow notifications in relation to the WTO 
rules; and projected notifications through 2018. Also ethanol policies and the WTO rules were carefully 
analysed in order to better understand the Brazilian domestic support.  
Through this paper the reader will be able to have a better understanding of Brazilian agricultural 
domestic support policies with respect to WTO rules—a topic not well evaluated in the academic arena up 
to this time. A lot of scientific work has been done in the field of domestic support, but little has been 
done to better understand domestic support policies of specific countries in light of the WTO legal 
system.  
Keywords: Brazil’s agricultural support, WTO Doha Round, notifications of domestic support, 
WTO compliance 
   viii
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Trade-distorting domestic subsidies for agricultural products are among the most contentious issues in the 
Doha Development Round. It would not be a stretch to affirm that disciplining domestic support has 
become the most important shared offensive interest among developing countries; it has acted as the glue 
that keeps the G-20 an active coalition in the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. Although 
there is a consensus that domestic support disciplines must be strengthened by the Doha Round, the 
concrete meaning in terms of cuts, caps, commitments, and allocation of subsidies in the boxes remains 
controversial. The topic is broader than simply the Doha Round because it also involves other spheres of 
the WTO, like the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and the functioning of the Agriculture Committee. 
The topic is evolving and embracing new perspectives. The most important is, no doubt, the subsidies for 
agricultural-based biofuels. 
This paper deals with subsidies granted to the Brazilian agricultural sector. The agricultural sector 
is like no other sector of the Brazilian economy. It is at the heart of political attention because farm 
productivity from the 20th century and on has hugely increased due to technological modernization. 
Brazil has grown, in only a few years, to become among the top agricultural exporters in light of its 
increases in output. Consequently, trade liberalization has become an issue of central importance for the 
sustainability of Brazilian agriculture, and domestic subsidies together with market access are at the root 
of the problem.  
In recent years, Brazil has appeared as a major player in the issue of strengthening the disciplines 
for trade-distorting domestic subsidies in the Doha Round and in the WTO legal system. Brazil has led 
two very important disputes against trade-distorting subsidies: cotton and sugar cases. Brazil is also in the 
heart of the Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) case that has been in course in the WTO 
DSB. 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) producer support 
equivalent shows that Brazil is a big agricultural producer with low levels of subsidies when compared 
with other developing countries. Among China, Russia, South Africa, and Ukraine, non-OECD members 
that have been monitored by the OECD, Brazil is at the bottom in terms of the percentage of producer 
support equivalent. 
The country has decided to be transparent, opening all information related to its agricultural 
policy: Different from other developing countries, Brazil updated its WTO domestic support notifications 
to 2004, and its policies since 2005 have been submitted to the OECD for evaluation. Stronger disciplines 
and tougher commitments, along with transparency, are of central interest for Brazil in the multilateral 
negotiations. The process of updating the notifications and projecting government support to the 
agricultural sector presented in this paper indicates that most information regarding agricultural policies 
expenditures is publicly available at Brazilian government websites, with the exception of subsidies 
related to debt rescheduling programs. As discussed in the paper, those programs were the most difficult 
to be interpreted and trace    in terms of data and methodologies used by the government to prepare the 
notifications. 
This paper will focus on Brazilian agricultural policy with respect to programs that could be 
considered supported by the government and distortive to trade. The analysis of current domestic support 
programs with trade-distorting effects, as understood within the WTO legal system and more specifically 
the Agreement on Agriculture (Agreement), will be studied in detail. Policy instruments will be linked to 
agricultural support programs as well as descriptions of how the amount of corresponding subsidy is 
calculated and where it is notified in the WTO documents. Moreover, a series of projections with respect 
to product-specific subsidies are extrapolated up to 2018.  
The main objective of this paper is to provide reliable information with respect to Brazil, offering 
a better understanding of current subsidies in light of the Doha Round. Brazilian notifications, however, 
are not freed from questioning, and this paper will discuss alternative approaches to measures taken by 
the federal government. Alternative approaches will not change the conclusion that Brazilian subsidies 2 
 
still remain low in relation to the agricultural output or even on a product-specific basis. They show that 
Brazil is in a comfortable position to accept stronger disciplines, even the ones applied in developed 
countries. 
There remains an unresolved question related to the WTO disciplines for domestic support: How 
will biofuels subsidies be treated within the WTO? Although agricultural-based biofuels production is 
increasing at rapid rates in the United States, European Union, and Brazil, it is still not clear how to 
classify ethanol and biodiesel policies within the WTO context. Some countries are notifying certain 
policies except the two big ones, which are tax exemptions/tax credits and blending mandates. However, 
so far, none of the member countries has decided to notify these policies in the WTO as domestic 
agricultural support. This paper provides a brief discussion on the ethanol policies in place in Brazil and a 
few alternatives that could be used for notifying biofuels policies in the WTO. 3 
 
2.  SYNOPSIS OF POLICIES AND RECENT STUDIES 
With regard to the rural sector, Brazilian policies are organized in two general policy frameworks: 
agricultural policy and agrarian policy (Chaddad and Jank 2006). The agrarian policy comprises programs 
related to agrarian reform and land settlement projects. Budgetary expenses with agrarian reform 
programs are notified as general services in the green box. Agrarian policies will not be discussed in this 
paper, not only because they are notified in the green box, but also because commercial and family 
farmers do not benefit by such policies. 
Agricultural policy in Brazil benefits two groups: commercial farmers and family farmers. The 
classification and division of these two groups was developed based on the 1996 Agricultural Census. 
This dissection is also visible in government structure: Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAPA) 
manages the policies for commercial farmers, and the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) 
manages programs for agrarian reform and policies for family farming (Damico and Nassar 2007). 
However, policies can be implemented by the same government agency. That is the case with income 
support programs, which are implemented by the National Food Supply Company (CONAB). In addition, 
the nature of the policies is also very similar: They are strongly based on providing credit lines with 
reduced interest rates, for both commercial and family farmers. 
Policy framework-wise, the division between the beneficiary groups becomes clear in the 
preferential credit policies: Credit programs for family farmers are established in the National Program 
for the Strengthening of Family Farming (PRONAF), which offers favorable conditions for credit 
availability and lower interest rates when compared with programs for commercial farmers (MAPA 2007 
and MDA 2007). 
The Brazilian federal government follows five main agricultural policy strategies, as follows 
(Damico and Nassar 2007): (1) production, marketing, and investment credit for commercial farmers; (2) 
income support programs for commercial and family farmers; (3) rural development and family farming; 
(4) debt management programs for commercial and family farmers; and (5) rural insurance for 
commercial farmers.  
With the exception of the rural insurance program, Brazilian agricultural policy is based on two 
main tools: rural credit generally available for all farmers with preferential interest rates, and income 
support programs for specific commodities. Debt rescheduling programs are, in essence, based on the 
preferential credit. Rural insurance is a relatively new strategy, begun by the federal government in 2005. 
Currently, this program is still very small in terms of production coverage and its availability to 
producers. 
2.1. Production, Marketing, and Investment Credit Programs 
The rationale behind the preferential credit policies in Brazil is related to high interest rates that have 
prevailed in the country and to the fact that agriculture production is a risky economic activity. Credit 
policy is directed to the farming community directly via government sourcing or indirectly through 
financial institutions. The federal government requires that banks keep a total of 25 percent of deposits 
available for farming credit. Moreover, rural savings, the National Development Bank (BNDES) and the 
Workers Support Fund complement the remaining source of funding for agricultural credit
1.  
In order to implement credit policies based on preferential interest rates, the government has 
developed the National System of Rural Credit (SNCR). The SNCR has adopted many changes since its 
creation in the late 1960s. The basic principle of the system, however, remains the same: to organize 
various sources of funding that are devoted to rural credit and to allocate funds among several agencies 
that are responsible for lending the resources. The allocation is made according to the different credit 
                                                      
1 Data on amount of preferential credit available to producers as well as explanations about the sources of funds can be 
obtained in the Rural Credit Yearbook published by the Brazilian Central Bank. This paper used data from 1999 to 2007 
yearbooks (BACEN, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007). 4 
 
programs defined by the federal government. There are four credit programs in place (OECD 2005): (1) 
working capital credit
2, (2) marketing credit, (3) investment credit for commercial farmers, and (4) 
PRONAF for family farmers. Working capital credit and marketing loans, also known as EGF (federal 
government loans), are both short-term credit. The first provides credit to cover cropping activities 
(acquisition of seeds and fertilizers) and variable costs associated with production. Marketing loans are 
oriented to provide capital for after-harvesting activities, such as storage. Investment credit is focused on 
medium-term loans for capital goods acquisitions. PRONAF is a set of policies based on working capital 
and investment credit and is discussed separately in section 2.3 below. 
Preferential credit policies have been in place in Brazil since the 1970s. Those policies were the 
main instruments used by the government to stimulate the expansion of agricultural production. When 
they began, these policies pursued two main objectives: to guarantee food security, and to promote the 
occupation of the Brazilian territory with agricultural production. During the 1970s and 1980s, real 
interest rates were negative, and there was no restriction on the availability of credit. 
The purpose of these credit policies has changed since the beginning of the 1990s. As a 
consequence of the balance-of-payments crisis and hyperinflation, preferential credit policies, especially 
for working capital and marketing, have lost importance as a mechanism to increase production. 
Moreover, the amount of available credit decreased in real terms during that period. It was only in 2003 
that the amount of credit began to grow once again, reaching, in 2008, the levels of the late 1980s (Figure 
1).  
In the case of production and marketing credit for commercial farmers, two elements of current 
policies are worth mentioning. First, loans are limited per farmer. For example, a soybean producer is 
limited to a Brazilian Real (R$) 300,000/year loan. Second, increasingly a portion of the shares of the 
total available credit is subjected to market interest rates rather than preferential interest rates. For 
example, preferential interest rate, or the controlled interest rate, is 6.75 percent a year in the 2007–2008 
crop season, but this rate is only for three-fourths of the total available credit, the other one-fourth having 
no controlled interest rates. Free interest rates operations represented 30 percent of the 2007 balance of 
credit operations. In the middle of the 1990s, that share was of 23 percent. 


























Source: BACEN; MAPA (2007) and MDA (2007). Note: (e) denotes an estimate. 
                                                      
2 In this section we will refer to production credit and working capital credit as synonyms. 5 
 
The 1990s have proved that availability of credit is a constraint in the performance of the 
Brazilian agricultural production. Figure 2 shows that credit availability and agricultural output measured 
by the value of production follow the same trend. Although the paper does not address the issue of the 
causality between availability of credit and production performance, it is clear that in the period between 
1995 to 2007 the value of production has decreased following a decrease in available credit for the same 
years. Interesting to note is that total production is increasingly financed by credit programs in Brazil. The 
reduction of the credit share on total output from 1995 to 2001 is explained not only by the low 
availability of resources for credit, as shown in Figure 1, but also by the high level of credit default that 
prevents farmers from getting new loans. Among other factors, the balance of credit started to grow again 
in 2003 as a response to the debt rescheduling program. 






















































Sources: IBGE and BACEN. Note: Balance of credit operations on December 31; (e) denotes an estimate. 
Working capital and marketing credit function under similar procedures and interest rates. The 
difference is that working capital loans are taken before the cropping season and are used to buy inputs 
for planting. The loan period is around nine months and is paid when the production is sold. Marketing 
loans are normally six months long and are used to finance product storage. Both are subjected to limits 
on a per-producer basis as mentioned before. Both credit modalities are notified to the WTO as product-
specific support because the producer has to specify the product for which the credit will be used. 
However, the distribution of resources among products is not predefined and depends on demand from 
producers. 
It is important to comprehend that the amount of capital for planting and marketing activities 
channeled to the agricultural production through the SNCR represents only a portion of the total demand 
for credit in the agricultural sector. The official credit is less than 40 percent in relation to the value of 
production, with the exception of corn (Figure 3). Credit for planting is below 25 percent of the value of 
production, again with the exception of corn. This explains why grains production in Brazil, especially 
soybeans and cotton, is dependent on private credit supplied by trading companies and inputs from 
producers. Private credit, however, is not subsidized, unlike the credit available through government 
funding. 6 
 
Figure 3. Share of SNCR working capital credit and marketing loans compared to value of 


































































Sources: IBGE and BACEN. Note: Balance of credit operations on December 31. 
Investment credit composes a more complex structure, as there are many programs with different 
objectives. The largest program among the line of programs provided by the BNDES is the 
MODERFROTA (Programa de Modernização da Frota de Tratores Agrícolas e Implementos Associados 
e Colheitadeiras). It is aimed at providing investment credit to medium- and large-scale producers to 
renovate equipment such as tractors and other agricultural machinery. There are, however, seven other 
specific credit line programs provided by the BNDES: Incentives Programme for Irrigation and Storage 
(MODERINFRA), Cooperative Development Programme for the Enhancement of Agricultural Value 
Added (PRODECOOP), Programme for the Modernization of Agriculture and the Conservation of 
Natural Resources (MODERAGRO), Agri-business Development Programme (PRODEAGRO), Fruit 
Industry Development Programme (PRODEFRUTA), Milk Production Mechanization and Transportation 
Incentive Programme (PROLEITE), and the Programme of Commercial Planting and Recovery Forest 
(PROPFLORA).  
In the case of the MODERFROTA, the equivalent measurement of support is estimated by 
observing the difference between the interest rate charged to borrowers (at 7.5 percent to middle-income 
producers and 9.5 percent to larger producers) from the BNDES and the equivalent long-term market rate 
(the TJLP rate). The MODERINFRA is a program designed to assist farmers in improving the structure of 
farm production by investing in proper irrigation. This program is independent from other credit 
programs, and by taking this loan farmers are not limited from getting other types of loans. The 
MODERINFRA funds projects up to R$1,000,000 per farmer or cooperative.  
Another line of credit is offered to agricultural cooperatives and is intended to allow for gains in 
efficiency through a series of steps. The PRODECOOP finances machinery and equipment as well as 
studies and projects design to improve production within the region. The government provides a 
preferential credit rate of 6.75 percent for up to 90 percent of the project. The cooperative is allowed a 
three-year grace period (with no interest paid) and 144 months for repayment in the case of non working 
capital credit and 24 months for repayment in the case of working capital credit.  
Credit for quality improvement in the areas of apiculture, floriculture, and aquaculture was 
offered through the PRODEAGRO. The credit line was up to R$150,000 at an 8.75 percent interest rate. 
The borrower was allowed a 24-month grace period (with no interest paid) and a 60-month repayment 7 
 
period. The PRODEGRO was substituted by the MODERAGRO program. Its main goals include the 
PRODEAGRO areas plus credit for pasture conservation and soil recovery through funds of up to 
R$250,000 per farm and R$750,000 per collectives undertakings. Similar to the most BNDES programs, 
interest rates are made available at 6.75 percent per year, which already includes a 3 percent 
compensation to the financial institution. The borrower is also allowed a 36-month grace period (with no 
interest paid) and a 96-month repayment period. 
The BNDES, through PRODEFRUTA, provides a special line of credit to improve efficiency in 
the fruit industry. The PRODEFRUTA provides total coverage of improvement projects at the same 8.75 
percent interest rate as other BNDES programs. A 5 percent compensation to the finance institution is 
included, and the borrower has a grace period of 36 months to avoid paying interest. The loan is to be 
paid within 60 months.  
The milk industry is benefited by a special line of credit for storage installation and related costs. 
The PROLEITE makes available credit lines of up to R$80,000 in projects per producer at an 8.75 percent 
interest rate (which includes a 3 percent compensation to the financial institution). Repayment is to be 
done within a 60-month period, which includes a 24-month grace period.   
The final BNDES-specific program is directed at environmental conservation. The PROPFLORA 
allows for credit lines of up to R$150,000 (up to 35 percent of the total cost) designated for tree-planting 
projects. Repayment is to be done within 12 years at an 8.75 percent interest rate (including financial 
compensation of 3 percent to the lending agency), with a 96-month grace period.  
The MODERFROTA as well as all seven other programs from the BNDES are considered, by the 
Brazilian government, to be “development programs.” As such, they are notified to the WTO under 
Article 6.2 on its schedule under table DS:2. They are exempt from reduction commitments, according to 
the principle in Article 6.2 of the Agreement, which states that “investment subsidies which are generally 
available to agriculture in developing country Members and agricultural input subsidies generally 
available to low-income or resource-poor producers in developing country Members shall be exempt from 
domestic support reduction commitments.” 
2.2. Income Support Programs 
There are two groups of income support programs: (1) instruments under which the product ends up in the 
government stocks (AGF - Federal Government Acquisitions  and COA - Contract Options Acquisitions) 
and (2) instruments that aim to facilitate the distribution of the product through market channels and are 
based on price equalization premium (PEP - Premium to Commercial Buyers, PROP - Premium to 
Commercial Buyers Under a Private Sell Option Contract, and PEPRO - Equalization Premium to 
Farmers). 
Income support programs are inherited from the Policy of Guaranteed Minimum Prices (PGPM), 
and were widely used by the federal government during the 1970s and 1980s to intervene in the market by 
controlling prices and stimulating production throughout stocks management (OECD 2005). Two 
instruments were used by the government: AGF and federal government loans (EGF). Through the first 
mechanism, the government purchases agricultural products at prices higher than the market prices 
(CONAB 2008a). In the past, the government used intervention stocks to regulate the market supply. If 
prices were high, then the government would sell stocks. The second mechanism of the PGPM, the EGF, 
is a federal government loan that provides short-term preferential credit to agricultural producers and 
cooperatives, allowing them to withhold the sale of a product for a certain period in anticipation of a 
higher market price. The EGF is, therefore, a marketing loan with subsidized interest rates. Prior to 1996, 
EGF operated as an AGF: Borrowers could choose to give up the pledged product and in turn repay the 
loan (i.e., the EGF with a sell option, or EGF-COV). 
Due to this policy, the federal government accumulated large stocks of products such as wheat, 
rice, corn, and dry beans during some crop seasons. This policy became unsustainable after the Brazilian 
policy shift toward market opening and was reformed in the early 1990s. AGFs are still in place, but the 
objective to use acquisitions as a mechanism to control prices is no longer applicable. Since 2004, the 8 
 
AGF is used mainly for purchasing from family producers. Clearly, the current AGF system indicates a 
change in Brazilian agricultural policy: The objective of promoting food security has been shifted to 
promoting income support for family producers (Chaddad and Jank 2006; CONAB 2008c). 
The use of federal government purchases as a mechanism to sustain prices for producers is still 
utilized in some specific seasons and specific crops. One example is the Government Sell-Option 
Contracts (CONAB 2008a, 2008b). Options contracts are auctioned at the start of the crop season. The 
mechanism guarantees the holder a future sale at a fixed “execution” price. If the holder decides to 
exercise the option, which tends to occur when the market price is below the execution price, then the 
government may buy back or transfer its obligation to purchase the product before its option contract 
expires though a recourse process, or transfer its purchasing rights to private agents. Once the government 
decides to buy back the contract, the farmer delivers the production under the contract to the government 
and receives the execution price. That type of operation has been used often for rice in 2005, 2006, and 
2007. Both AGFs and options contracts are notified using the WTO’s market price support (MPS) 
methodology. 
Since Brazilian agricultural policy reform in the early 1990s, new income support programs were 
put in place. There are two aspects to these programs: a reference price for the farmer and an equalization 
premium that is sold for private agents (wholesale buyers or producers) in auctions. The government sets 
the amount of product that will be available in the auction. This means that the equalization premium 
programs are not generally available for the whole production and are targeted to least-developed regions, 
where the price at the farm level tends to be lower, disadvantaged by transportation costs. There are three 
mains modalities (CONAB 2008d, 2008e, 2008f): 
1.   PEP is granted to wholesale buyers as long as it pays for the producer a reference price. 
The equalization premium, which is the subsidy, is obtained in a public auction and the 
maximum value is fixed by the government. PEP targets stored production. 
2.  PROP works like PEP, but the delivery of the product will take place in the future. It is a 
mechanism to guarantee a future price, and it works as a hedge mechanism for the farmer. 
3.  PEPRO is an equalization premium granted to a producer through a public auction. The 
government sets the reference price and sells the premium in an auction. The equalization 
premium, which is the subsidy, is in general lower than the difference between the market 
price and the reference price. 
Table 1 presents the amount of production benefited by income support programs in comparison 
with the total production. The following comments are noteworthy: 
1.  Higher prices in 2008 have interrupted the upward trend in the use of those mechanisms 
observed from 2005 to 2007. Income support programs were used in 2008 only for cotton 
and for an inconsequential amount of maize. 
2.  The amount of production benefited by support varies according to the crop season. This is 
due to the fact that income support programs are operated by CONAB after the harvesting 
season. There is no predefined rule for the implementation of the instruments and, with the 
exception of PEPRO, the decision of the government in terms of types of instruments and 
parameters (reference price, equalization premium, etc.) to be used depends on the situation 
of prices during the marketing period (March to December). 
3.  AGF/COA (Contract Option Acquisition) instruments are relevant only for rice. Although 
only AGF is a government procurement program, COA also works like one because the 
producer may opt to execute the contract against the government, and by doing that, the 
government shall receive the physical product. In both instruments, therefore, the 
government withdraws production from the market, potentially shifting prices upward and 
subsidizing the whole stored production.  
4.  The equalization premium instruments only promote the reallocation of production in the 
country. Aside from that, government expenditures per product unit (not shown in Table 1) 9 
 
are much higher in AGF/COA than in equalization premium. A potential problem of the 
last program is when the benefited production is exported. In this case, the equalization 
premium can act as an indirect export subvention. That is the case of cotton. 
Table 1. Income support program benefited shares of production (thousand tons) 
  2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08      2004/05  2005/06 2006/07 2007/08
Cotton                Cassava             
Production 1,299 1,038 1,524 1,603    Production 25,872  26,639  26,921  26,599 
AGF/COA  5 0 1 0    AGF/COA  0 0 0 0 
Equalization 
Premium  470 464 729  1,024    Equalization 
Premium  76 189 0  0 
                                
Rice                Soybeans         
Production 13,227  11,722  11,316  12,057    Production 52,305  55,027  58,392  60,017 
AGF/COA 917  308  920  0   AGF/COA  0  15  0  0 
Equalization 
Premium  328 699 158  0    Equalization 
Premium  0 11,953  5,354 0 
                             
Edible beans             Wheat             
Production 3,044 3,471 3,340 3,521    Production  5,846 4,873 2,234 3,824 
AGF/COA  0  3 36 0    AGF/COA  483  32 0  0 
Equalization 
Premium  0  0 125 0    Equalization 
Premium  1,345 240  0  0 
                                
Maize         Coffee         
Production  34,977  42,515  51,370  58,610    Production  2,356 1,977 2,551 2,024 
AGF/COA  637  2,224  273  0    AGF/COA  0 0 0 0 
Equalization 
Premium  874 5,586  4,936 165    Equalization 
Premium  0 0  300  0 
Source: CONAB. Note: AGF (Federal Government Acquisition); COA (Contract Option Acquisition). 
2.3. Rural Development and Family Farming Support 
With the creation of the Ministry of Agrarian Development in middle of the 1990s, the government 
started to channel funds from the SNCR to family farmers through PRONAF. PRONAF is a set of 
programs based on credit with preferential interest rates (MDA 2007). This program is gaining relevance 
in the SNCR, not only in terms of amount of resources available for credit, but also in terms of 
subsidization level, which is considerably higher than the credit for commercial farmers. Despite the fact 
that PRONAF is basically a credit program, we classify it as a different policy strategy because it targets 
farmers with low income and with poor available resources. PRONAF’s main objective is to provide the 
necessary financial means for low-income farmers and agrarian reform settlers to remain in rural areas.  
Additionally, the PRONAF is composed of a complex structure that is intended to assist small 
agricultural producers that are not classified under the general credit lines. Moreover, the PRONAF 
provides both working capital credit and investment credit through its line of programs. Furthermore, it is 
interesting to note that credit provided to family farmers through PRONAF is at even more preferential 
(lower) rates than credit provided to commercial farmers through the general credit line. 
The amounts of resources for PRONAF credit lines are rising over time, and investment programs 
are gaining more relevance. In 2000, PRONAF loans totaled US$1 billion, 86 percent for working capital 
credit and 14 percent for investment. For the 2007–2008 crop season it is estimated that US$5.8 billion 
will be available for loans, 50 percent designated for investment programs. 10 
 
PRONAF beneficiaries are divided into five different groups (A, B, C, D, and E). The 
classification depends on the size of the farm, the number of people employed, production, and the 
income of the farmer (MDA 2008); 
1.  Group A: agrarian reform settlers (investment and working capital) 
2.  Group B: small subsistence farmers who are eligible for micro credit (income support 
program) 
3.  Group C: increasing degree of commercial production; however, intensive use of family 
labor (60 percent of income has to come from agriculture) 
4.  Group D: also signs of commercial production with use of family labor plus some 
additional contracted labor (70 percent of income has to come from agriculture) 
5.  Group E: same as for Group D; however, at least 80 percent of income has to come from 
agriculture 
PRONAF credit lines, modalities (working capital or investment), and interest rates are defined 
according to the beneficiary group. Table 2 shows the annual and fixed interest rates that were set for the 
2007–2008 crop season. 
Table 2. Interest rates of PRONAF credit modalities 
Group 
Modality 
Working capital  Investment 
Group A  n.a.  0.5% 
Group B  n.a.  0.5% 
Group C  3.0%  2.0% 
Group D  3.0%  2.0% 
Group E  5.5%  5.5% 
Source: MDA, 2007. 
Note: n.a.: not available. 
2.4. Debt Management Programs 
The credit-based agricultural policy that predominates in Brazil is not exempt from complications. Its 
major complication is how to manage the level of indebtedness of the rural sector. Although credit 
programs are conducted with preferential interest rates, producers are not always able to repay their loans 
for several reasons, resulting in increasing levels of indebtedness in the rural sector. Some reasons are 
crop frustration due to poor weather conditions or emergence of new diseases (e.g., the soybean rust in 
2005), overinvestment on production capacity with immobilization of capital on land and machinery, and 
income loss due to high transportation costs or to changes in the macroeconomic policy (Brazilian Real 
overvaluation or inflation control). 
Debt management became an objective of Brazilian agricultural policy when the government 
decided to renegotiate the overdue rural credit, intending to allow producers to continue taking new loans 
and rolling over the old ones. The three most important arrangements were the rural debt securitization 
(November 1995 and April 2002), the financial assets rehabilitation program (PESA, February 1998) and 
the renegotiation of family farming programs (PRONAF, PROCERA, and PROGER). In September of 
2008, through the federal law 11,775 (September 17, 2008), the government took another step with the 
debt rescheduling program. Not only the remaining non-paid debts already included in the three previous 
arrangements were renegotiated, but also new unpaid debts obtained after the implementation of these 
arrangements were also included in this new renegotiation. The new debt renegotiation process is, in 11 
 
concept, different from the others: The program is based on incentives to farmers to pay the debts with 
rebates and discounts on the interest rate. The new policy is more of a debt liquidation and 
regularization—for the unpaid renegotiated debts covered by the previous programs—than a rescheduling 
program, as previous programs were.  
It is not of relevance for this paper to discuss in further depth the reasons the rescheduling 
programs were created. What is relevant is that all main credit modalities were, since 1995, benefited by 
rescheduling conditions. At the end of 2002, the base period used by the government for the calculation of 
the subsidy equivalent of the rescheduling program as notified in the WTO, the balance of overdue credit 
totaled R$29.2 billion, more than 50 percent of which was associated with securitization and PESA. 
The general principle of rescheduling programs is to prolong the period of payment with interest 
rates that lower than the original interest rate. The burden for the Brazilian government lies in the 
difference between the renegotiated interest rate and the cost of the money associated with the original 
loan as distributed in the original scheduled period compared to the repayment as it has been renegotiated 
over the new period.  The amount of subsidy depends on the present value of the overdue debt, the 
payment schedule (24 years for the securitization program and 20 years for the PESA), and the difference 
in interest rates.  
Although the securitization has been in place since the end of 1995, the government began 
notifying the rescheduling programs in 1999. The main motivation for the government to notify the 
rescheduling schemes was that, for the first time, the OECD assessed the Brazilian agricultural policy and 
calculated the Brazilian producer support equivalent (OECD 2005). In order to supply the best 
information regarding the rescheduling schemes to the OECD, the government gathered data that were 
located in different ministries and banks and, by doing so, was able to notify the information when the 
notifications from 1998 to 2003 were released. 
Many factors worked together to result in the recent announcement of law number 11,775: the 
expansion of lending since 2002; the income and price problems that the agricultural sector faced from 
2004 to 2006; a push by the agricultural lobby for a new debt renegotiation, including the renegotiation of 
the debts already renegotiated under the securitization and PESA schemes; and the renegotiation of the 
new loans (both working capital and investment credit) acquired from 2002 to 2006. 
According to the Ministry of Finance, by August of 2007, the balance overdue was R$87.8 
billion. This amount is distributed as follows: R$27.4 billion under renegotiation programs; R$10.5 
billion under new working capital credit; R$17.3 billion under new investment and marketing credit; 
R$12 billion under constitutional funds that were not subjected to rescheduling programs; and R$7.1 
billion under execution by the Brazilian treasury and that were originated from rescheduled debt not paid 
(MF 2008 and 2008a). It is necessary to add also R$13.4 billion of overdue credit originated from 
programs to family farming. 
This amount of credit was subjected to negotiation among the government, the congress, and 
producer (commercial and family) lobbying organizations. The objective of the new program is to 
stimulate farmers to liquidate its debts using economic incentives such as rebates on future payments and 
discounts on interest rates for anticipation of the payments. Depending on the level of engagement by 
farmers under this new regulation, it will eventually replace the old programs. The specific conditions of 
each debt modality in terms of payment schedule, interest rates, and debt balance makes the calculation of 
subsidies a hard task for nongovernment officials. Regarding this matter, this paper will not present any 
calculation regarding the new debt liquidation and compliance programs.  
Debt rescheduling and management programs play an important role in the Brazilian agricultural 
policy at the moment. Such a role is played due to poor credit policies in the past that resulted in massive 
national default. Debt rescheduling programs are becoming the most important source of subsidies for 
Brazilian producers, both for commercial and family farming. 12 
 
2.5. Rural Insurance 
Although not explored in great detail here, we have reason to believe that rural insurance is a new strategy 
taking place in the Brazilian agricultural policy. There is a common perception among policymakers and 
producers that the country must develop a comprehensive national insurance policy to reduce the risks 
associated with climate, plagues, and diseases that negatively affect crop yields and, consequently, 
farmers’ incomes. This insurance policy is seen as the solution to avoid problems with indebtedness in the 
future, not allowing the likes of the defaults observed in 2004–2006. The current program is, however, 
still very small and irrelevant in terms of the total agricultural production.  
The new rural insurance program was created in 2005 and introduced in 2006 by the federal 
government. The program is still in its initial phase, and as for the moment, benefits are relatively small 
(MAPA). The amount of collateral paid in (partly by the producer, however, the majority was paid by the 
government) is small, and consequently, it covers only a small portion of the production. In addition, 
there is a limit (up to R$32,000) to the amount a producer can insure production, limiting even further the 
scope of the program. 
Given that the last Brazilian notification is dated from 2004, and the new rural insurance program 
started in 2005, there is no information about it in the WTO. This paper presents the estimated 
subventions of the insurance program, based on information gathered from the MAPA website. Due to its 
infancy, small scale, and therefore, no trade-distorting effect, this topic will not be explored in further 
detail. 
2.6. Brief Description of Green Box Subsidies 
General services such as research, training, advisory, inspection, marketing and promotion, and 
infrastructure services are provided by the government with no or very little trade-distorting effects. Both 
food aid programs and public stockholding programs are directed toward consumers only and are 
therefore not trade distorting. Moreover, the new insurance program, as described in section 2.5, is still 
under development and, up to the time of writing this paper, amounted to insignificant levels.  
Policies related to agrarian reform are managed by the National Institute for Colonization and 
Agrarian Reform (INCRA) and supervised by the MDA. 
INCRA’s programs vary from infrastructure development to initial credit. Agrarian reform 
programs are protected under Annex II of the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture and are exempt from 
reduction commitments. Furthermore, green box subsidies, due to their minimal trade-distorting effects, 
will not be discussed any further. 13 
 
3.  REPLICATION OF OFFICIAL WTO SUPPORT NOTIFICATIONS  
This section discusses the methodologies used by the Brazilian government in order to calculate its 
subsidies, as well as the data presented in the notifications. The period of analysis of this section and the 
one that follows includes the following: the Brazilian notifications to the WTO to date (which are from 
1995 to 2004), an estimation calculated by the authors (which goes from 2005 to 2007), and a forecast for 
2008. Methodologies are discussed according to the main programs presented in former sections. 
3.1. Methodologies Used by the Brazilian Government 
3.1.1. Credit Subsidies 
The first line of domestic support programs calculated in this paper is what Brazil notifies under credit 
subsidies. Credit subsidies are simply gathered by analyzing the market-based interest rate, subtracting 
the preferential rate available under the subsidy, and multiplying by the amount borrowed from the 
SNCR. 
Although the methodology is the same for all credit subsidies, there are differences in the 
calculation of production and marketing credit for commercial farmers, production for family farmers, 
and investment credit. In the case of working capital and marketing for commercial farmers, calculations 
are product-specific. There is no breakdown by product in the case of production credit for family 
farming. 
Investments credit subsidies are calculated according to the specific conditions of each program. 
The total subsidy, as presented in WTO table DS:2 (Article 6.2), is the sum of the per-program subsidies. 
There is no distinction between commercial and family farming in the case of investments credit. 
However, this distinction can be made by separating and classifying the programs according to the 
beneficiary group. 
For credit subsidies, the same method as the one used by the federal government was used to 
calculate estimates for the period of 2005 to 2007 and to forecast 2008. The market base interest rate is 
defined as the short-term government reference interest rate, which is the SELIC rate. Moreover, the 
preferential interest rate varies from program to program. The family programs (PRONAF) offer 
preferential interest rates that are lower than the ones provided to commercial farming, as shown above. 
Regardless of specific levels, it is important to bear in mind the fact that the government makes a clear 
distinction between family farming and commercial farming, and this is represented in the type/amount of 
support. As mentioned earlier, but worth stressing here as well, such distinctions are a new trend in the 
Brazilian agricultural policy. The political focus seems to be moving toward a more developmental basis, 
focusing on the low-income and small farms and their means for surviving. 
The methodology used by the government is not equivalent to the value of government 
expenditures. It is a methodology based on an opportunity cost approach. This means that the lower the 
market interest rate in Brazil, the lower the subsidy for a given subsidized interest rate. One should also 
note that after many years of keeping the preferential interest rate fixed, for the 2007–2008 crop season, 
the government reduced the rate. 
Moreover, the methodology used in this paper to calculate production and marketing subsidies 
has one difference from the methodology used by the government. Given that the government has access 
to loans on a monthly basis, the subsidy is calculated by the month and summed up to annual data, as 
reported in the notifications. Data on loans released by the Brazilian Central Bank, which are the ones 
available for the authors, are annually based. Therefore, in order to have accurate projections for the years 
not yet notified, past years were recalculated using the annual data available and the results were 
compared with the notified data. Although the results were not equal to the government’s notifications, 
they followed the same trends. 14 
 
Given that projections from 2005 to 2008 were based on annual data, the annual relative variation 
calculated according to the author’s methodology were applied on the notified value, having 2004, the last 
notified year, as basis, therefore estimating the unofficial notifications for those years.  
In the case of investments, credit data by program is also not available to the public. Therefore, 
calculations were made based on an average interest rate applied over the total annual investment loans. 
Results for past years were also used to check whether the procedure works. 
3.1.2. Income Support Programs 
As far as methodology goes for income support programs, the same line as the one used by official 
government notifications to the WTO was followed. Because up-to-date information was available from 
government reports, they were used to construct the subsidy values for the unofficial notifications. The 
amount of subsidies in the case of equalization premium programs is the government expenditure with the 
programs. In the case of AFG and COA, the MPS methodology was applied. 
For MPS, the eligible production for the calculation is the amount procured by the government. 
Alternatively, the MPS would be calculated using the whole production. In this case, the aggregate 
measurement of support (AMS) commitment should also be recalculated, given that the notified 
commitments are based on the eligible production. 
3.1.3. Value of Production 
The value of production was an integral part of this study in terms of evaluating Brazil’s compliance with 
the WTO rules. Up to the year 2007, value of production data were available in government reports 
(IBGE, Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) and therefore were used. However, data were not 
available for the following years, and estimates were made using production values and market price 
trends, as discussed further when projections are presented in Section 6. 
3.1.4. Debt Rescheduling Program 
Certainly the calculation of the subsidies associated with the debt rescheduling program is the most 
complex task of this project. Even if the Brazilian government makes available information regarding the 
stock of debt, as done by the Ministry of Finance in 2008, information on interest rates of the original 
loan are quite difficult to be obtained. Even the mechanics of the calculations used by the government for 
the notified subsidies are not clear because the government has not published any document explaining 
the methodology used. It is important to note that the Debt Liquidation and Compliance Program 
announced in 2008 was not subjected to quantitative evaluation in this paper due to the lack of 
information available. 
According to explanations gathered in interviews with technical government officials, plus a 
confidential document dated 2004 that puts in systematic terms all the information used in the 
government to prepare the notifications, the amount of subsidy is the total cost of the program for the 
government. The total cost is calculated comparing the original interest rate of the loans and the 
renegotiated interest rate under the rescheduling program. Given that under the rescheduling program 
debts are rolled over time, future scheduled payments were brought to a base date (December 2002). The 
present value of the sum of payments was calculated and in turn compared with the stock of debt at the 
same date. This calculation had to be done in each program because interest rates and scheduled periods 
were different among programs. The difference between the stock of debt at a certain date and the present 
value of payments is the total amount of subsidy. This total was, then, divided by the lifetime of the 
schedule period, according to the specifications of each program, in equal annual statements. The annual 
statements were summed up, differentiating family farming programs from other programs. 
Annual statements were, therefore, calculated for the year 2002. The debt rescheduling program, 
however, has been notified since 1999. In both cases notifications prior and after 2002 were adjusted for 
inflation using the IGP-DI. From 1999 to 2001 annual inflation was discounted and for 2003 and 2004 the 15 
 
amount of subsidy was inflated. After adjusting for inflation the total was converted to U.S. dollars using 
the appropriate exchange rate. 
According to government officials, from 1999 to 2002, the government was able to calculate the 
amount of subsidy evaluating the balance between payments and installments. For the years 2003 and 
2004, by the time the notifications were made, the government had not had available data on payments 
hence the option used was to assume that 100 percent of the payments were performed.  
In order to double-check the methodology using unpublished and unofficial information gathered 
from government officials, calculations of the subsidy equivalent for 2002 were done and compared with 
the 2002 number presented in the notification. According to authors’ calculations, the subsidy in that year 
amounted to R$1.86 billion and the notified value was R$1.66 billion (US$570 million, converted using 
2.92 R$/US$ exchange rate). Although the results are not exactly the same, they are close. Given that 
payments were brought back to present value, year 2002, calculations for equivalent subsidy for 2002 
value were based on the notification.  
3.1.5. Distribution of Programs in the Notification 
Table 3 provides an insight to how the Brazilian domestic support is divided, under which WTO DS table 
it is notified, and a small description of how each subsidy was calculated. 
Table 3. Structure of Brazil’s WTO notifications 
Policy Strategies  Program/Policy Instrument  Where 
Notified  How Subsidy Is Calculated 
I. Working Capital and 
Investment Credit 
Subsidies (for commercial 
farmers) 
Production and marketing 
credit (product specific)  DS:7  Interest rates differential (market 
cost versus controlled interest rate) 
Production and marketing 
credit (non–product specific)  DS:9  Interest rates differential (market 
cost versus controlled interest rate) 
Investment credit  DS:2  Interest rates differential 
II. Income Support 
Programs 
Contract option acquisition 
and federal government 
acquisition 
DS:5  Government expenditures with 
purchases with minimum prices 





Government covering price 
differential between reference price 
and market price 
III. Rural Development and 
Family Farming Support 
Production and investment 
credit to family farmers  DS:2 Interest  rates  differential 
Debt rescheduling programs 
(family farmers)  DS:2 
Interest rate differential (debt 
market cost versus cost supported 
by the government) 
Agrarian reform programs  DS:1  Government expenditures 
IV. Debt Rescheduling and 
Management 
Debt rescheduling programs 
(commercial farmers)  DS:9 
Interest rate differential (debt 
market cost versus cost supported 
by the government) 
V. Rural Insurance 
Old insurance program  DS:1  Government expenditures 
New insurance program 
(from 2005)  DS:7  Government expenditures to 
equalize premium costs 
Source: Authors’ input. 16 
 
3.2. Description of Brazilian Notifications 
The total domestic support provided by the Brazilian government can be observed in Table 4, with 
production and marketing credit subsidies detailed in Table 5 and Article 6.2 subsidies in Table 6. The 
data from Table 4 was gathered from the Brazilian notifications to the WTO up the year 2004. The values 
for 2005–2008 are authors’ estimates and forecast of unofficial “shadow” notifications (discussed in 
further depth in the next section). The level of AMS commitment gradually declined according to the 
agreement reached in the Uruguay Round negotiations and was kept at the 2004 level for the estimates 
and forecasts presented in Table 4. Total AMS support after de minimis was above the Uruguay Round 
commitment only in 1995 after an adjustment by the authors to an apparent omission in the official 
notification. Product specific de minimis showed no consistent pattern apart from the fact that throughout 
the notified years it increased, reaching the highest level in 1999 (US$409 million). Moreover, support for 
products under Article 6.2 showed substantial levels in notified years and even greater levels since 2005, 
which shows the importance of domestic support programs that fall under this exemption to developing 
countries. Nevertheless, this support is still within the allowed guidelines. Lastly, non-product-specific de 
minimis presented drastic increases, from US$18.4 million in 1995 to US$1.07 billion in 2003.  
Moving on to production and marketing credit, one should note how interest rates move across 
time (the market interest rate and the preferential interest rate subsidized by the government). For this 
reason a graph of interest rate pattern (Figure 4) is presented along with the values for production and 
marketing credit subsidies (Table 5). Figure 4 shows interest rates for the production and marketing credit 
programs plotted along with the market interest rate. It is important to mention that product specific 
production and marketing credits are notified in the AMS Commitment if total product specific subsidies 
exceed the de minimis provision. Non-product-specific production and marketing credits, on the other 
hand, are one of the programs notified in NPS de minimis. Table 5 brings the total of PS and NPS 
production and marketing credit subsidies without identifying, in the case of PS subsidies, if they were 
notified in the AMS or if they were below de minimis. The objective of this table is to illustrate the effect 
of the variations in the SELIC rate in the production and marketing credit subsidies, given that they are a 
large component of the total subsidies. 



















Source: BACEN and MAPA. 17 
 
The AMS given by the Brazilian government has for the most part remained unchanged. Figure 5 
illustrates the pattern. Total applied AMS (after de minimis) has remained well below the allowed level 
according to Uruguay Round commitments. Even total AMS before de minimis has gone above allowed 
Uruguay Round levels for AMS after de minimis in only 3 out of 14 years: 1995, 2006(e) and 2007(e). 
It is worth to remind that Brazil is one of the few developing countries with a Total AMS 
commitment. Although it is not relevant nowadays, because Brazil has abolished all kinds of subsidies 
contingent to exports, Brazil has also commitments for export subsidies. The reason Brazil has a Total 
AMS commitment is because the combination of two policies that were in place at the Uruguay Round 
base period (1986-88): production and marketing credit at preferential rates and market price support for 
products with high tariffs at the time, such as wheat and cotton. Although a Total AMS Commitment of 
US$ 912.1 million is tiny compared to the production value of the Brazilian agriculture (around 1 
percent), there is no doubt that it grants Brazil with more space than for other developing countries that 
have product specific subsidies bound by the de minimis clause. 
























Source: Brazil’s notifications to the WTO. 
Brazil makes plentiful use of its developing status, and this is clear when one observes the use of 
Article 6.2 of the Agreement. The so-called development box is offered as a special and differential 
treatment to countries in need of such action. Brazil uses Article 6.2 to notify debt rescheduling and 
production credit (family farming only), as well as investment credit (for both family and commercial 
farming), as noted above.  
At this point, the Brazilian government’s behavior with respect to the use of investment credit 
under development programs should be stressed. It is clear that when applied toward family farming, 
investment credit reported under Article 6.2 makes sense. However, the Brazilian government makes no 
distinction in this case between commercial and family farming. Amounts for both programs are placed 
under Article 6.2 of the agreement.  
Table 7 shows the main programs notified as non product specific. Two of them are production 
and marketing programs for a group of products (animal breeding, seeds, and packaging). Both are 
calculated using a differential interest rate methodology as used for all production and marketing credits. 
The last and the most important are subsides associated to debt rescheduling programs. It is clear that 
subsidies are growing over time, as a consequence of the changes and the creation of new rescheduling 
programs. 18 
 
Table 4. Total support (in US$ thousands) 
    1995  1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004 2005(e)  2006(e)  2007(e)  2008(f) 
AMS 




1,043,226  0  0  82,820  0 0 0 0  0  0  132,122  0  289,720  339,181 
PS de minimis  235,297  283,473  236,709 304,981 409,064 230,446 235,768 211,831 249,548 278,626 335,861  957,570  671,328  247,769 
Article  6.2  358,872  269,293  280,721 372,901 155,985 309,668 331,546 392,763 494,511 394,312 769,793  628,841  357,258  657,863 
NPS de minimis 18,442  79,812  70,136 105,229 837,926 822,554 739,896 803,487  1,069,079 850,661 1,104,921 1,150,709 1,260,791 1,579,371 
Source: Brazilian notifications to the WTO (1995 – 2004) and authors’ estimates (e) and forecasts (f). Note: PS is product specific; NPS is non product specific. 
Table 5. Production and marketing credit subsidies (in US$ thousands) 






























































Source: Brazilian notifications to the WTO (1995 – 2004) and authors’ estimates (e) and forecasts (f). 19 
 
Table 6. Article 6.2 development programs (in US$ thousands) 
Period  1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005(e)  2006(e)  2007(e)  2008(f) 
Production 
Credit (family)  196,467  84,006 98,580  157,136 12,518 105,373 92,409 95,770 117,816 97,586 165,089 144,517 121,466 219,770
Investment 




0 0 0 0  14,131  15,405  13,239  13,347  13,766 16,277 19,800 22,999 27,725 32,839 
Source: Brazil’s notifications to the WTO (1995 – 2004) and authors’ estimates (e) and forecasts (f). 
Table 7. Non-product-specific subsidies (US$ thousands) 















-  -  -  -  589,424  642,601  552,220  556,726 574,217 678,974 825,894  959,349 1,156,477  1,369,800 
Total  18,442 79,812 70,136 105,229 837,926 822,554 739,896 803,487 1,069,079 850,661 1,104,921 1,150,709 1,260,791 1,579,371 
Source: Brazil’s notifications to the WTO (1995 – 2004) and authors’ estimates (e) and forecasts (f). 
 
 4.  CONSTRUCTION OF CONSISTENT SHADOW NOTIFICATION  
Moving forward to calculate Brazil’s shadow notifications for recent years, it is important to stress the 
methodology of how calculations were taken. First of all, the same format as presented in the notifications 
by the Brazilian government was kept. In other words, calculations follow the flow of the notification 
tables (DS:1, DS:2, and so on) as they represent the respective boxes (green, blue, and amber boxes). 
Moreover, constant consultations with government officials from MAPA provided immense insights into 
how calculations and therefore the notifications were made. Such information was necessary in order to 
understand the complex system of government support and how it is organized and presented to the 
international trade community.  
Furthermore, all calculations and assumptions were made based on widely accessible online 
information that can be found in various official government institutions’ databases. No confidential 
information, and for that matter, no detailed, inaccessible information was used (the government has 
access to monthly, weekly, and in some cases daily information that was not accessible for this 
publication), with the exception of some unpublished data regarding the debt rescheduling program. 
Once again, focus was diverged away from green box subsidies that are not substantial in terms 
of domestic support by the Brazilian government. Hence, the spotlight was given to the examination of 
AMS, for both product-specific and non-product-specific support, as well as checking conformity with de 
minimis limitations and paying attention to benefits granted under Article 6.2 of the Agreement.  
For table DS:2, Article 6.2 of the notifications, a review and update were made for production 
credit, investment credit, and debt rescheduling program designed for low-income producers. The 
aggregate value of these programs comes through as total support for programs under Article 6.2. 
Production credit was calculated with numbers provided by the BACEN database of available funds for 
the PRONAF programs. Numbers were made available up to the year 2007. This calculation involved all 
product-specific as well as non-product-specific programs. Programs were calculated in local currency 
and then converted into U.S. dollars in relation to the same year (for each year the exchange rate average 
was calculated based on monthly rates provided by BACEN). Whenever data was not available and/or 
was confidential for only government use, adjustments were made. This is also true for calculations 
involving investment programs and debt rescheduling programs, where a delta rate of change was 
extracted from previous years and used as the “rate of change” for the estimated years.  
Moreover, for calculations to find out the de minimis for a specific product, a standard method 
similar to the one developed for credit, investment, and debt rescheduling programs was used. 
Adjustments were necessary in order to calculate the data for products where data were not available. For 
instance, in the case of grape and garlic, the price of the product
3 was not available; hence, calculations 
were made using the last published year of the price and adjusting for further years as necessary by 
converting into the respective year’s exchange rate.
4 Adjustments were only made when there was no 
official government data available. For the years when the government reported the value of production, 
this data was used as input for further computations. 
Another domestic support program that receives considerable attention from the government is 
investment programs. Investment support programs were calculated by adding the amounts given to each 
particular program. Data was gathered from the BACEN balance sheet database, which is provided on a 
yearly basis. For investment programs, just as for shorter-term credit programs, domestic support is 
measured by focusing on the preferential interest rate made available to each producer for each particular 
support program. That is important to understand since in calculations for this paper an adjustment was 
                                                      
3 In this paper, the authors used the relationship between price and production in order to calculate the value of production 
for each good and then the result compared to the support amount made available for each product in order to find out the per 
cent of support in comparison to the value of production. 
4 Production data was collected from the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE) from its annual rural 
census.  21 
 
necessary in order to make a distinction between investment programs made available to poor and/or 
small farmers and the investment credit made available to commercial producers. 
In a study such as this it is only normal that a few results come out a bit different from what the 
government officially reports. Once again, one should take into consideration the different data available 
to the public and the far more specific data available to government officials. However, one significant 
difference was found during the course of this study. Though the government shows numbers that have so 
far fallen within the allowed AMS, this paper’s calculations show that in the year 1995 domestic support 
programs actually surpassed the allowed AMS ceiling by US$4,191,000, as shown in Section 3. 
4.1. Shadow Notifications for Aggregated Support 
Table 8 simplifies the results gathered by providing an overview of the Brazilian notifications since 1999 
as well as the updated shadow notification information through 2008. One important trend and of 
importance to Brazil is the fact that the total support (All AMS + Article 6.2 in Table 8) over total 
production value has in recent years seen a falling trend (from 6 percent in 2006 to 3 percent in 2008). 
That indeed shows room for growth within domestic support and the ability to remain within the allowed 
levels of support in the proposed modalities for the Doha Round. Moreover, as previously mentioned, 
Table 8 shows the pattern of increase spending in non-product-specific AMS from US$837.9 million in 
1999 to US$1.579 billion in 2008.22 
 
Table 8. Summary of the notifications main values 
Measure Type 
Monetary Value of the Measure (in US$ thousands) 
1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005(e)  2006(e)  2007(e)  2008(f) 
              
Product-specific AMS 
(including de minimis)  409,064 230,446 235,768 211,831 249,548 278,626 467,983 957,570 961,048 586,950 
1) Market Price Support  0 0 0 0 9,863 16,040 14,333 11,917 83,509 0 
2) Non-exempt Direct 
Payments 15,517 45,108 45,221 47,460 0  0 0 0 0 0 
3) Other Non-exempt Product-
specific Support  393,546 185,338 190,547 164,371 239,685 262,586 453,650 945,654 877,539 586,950 
     - Production and 
Marketing 
       Credit  378,063 146,205 138,321 155,209 233,511  217,223 231,181 164,206 115,007 236,820 
     - Equalization Premium  4,282 31,240 52,226 9,036 0 45,363 222,200 771,000 740,700 322,581 
     - Contract Option 
       Reacquisition  11,202 7,893 0 126 6,174  0 0 0 0 0 
     - Rural Insurance  0 0 0 0 0 0 268 10,448 21,832 27,549 
Non-product-specific AMS  837,926 822,554 739,896 803,487 1,069,079  850,661 1,104,921 1,150,709 1,260,791 1,579,371 
Article 6.2  155,985 309,668 331,546 392,763 494,511  394,312 769,793 628,841 357,258 657,863 
    PS AMS + Article 6.2  565,049 540,114 567,313 604,594 744,059  672,938 1,237,776 1,586,411 1,318,306 1,244,813 
   Total Support 
   (all AMS + Article 6.2)  1,812,038 1,593,114 1,542,977 1,619,912 2,062,686 1,802,225 2,810,680 3,694,691 3,540,144 2,824,184 
Total Production Value 
(TPV)  39,724,830 42,909,741 38,409,231 37,276,617 44,940,270 54,419,430 59,350,698 65,361,282 85,766,428 105,943,399 
Total as percent of TPV   5%  4%  4%  4%  5%  3%  5%  6%  4%  3% 
Source: Brazil’s notifications to the WTO and authors’ estimates (e) and forecast (f). PS is product specific. 
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Subsidies of the production and marketing credit programs were shown in Table 5 and also in 
Table 8. The notified years do not seem to present any particular pattern. It is clear, however, that both 
product-specific and non-product-specific values given to production and marketing programs have 
remained relatively level throughout the 14 years of available data.  
When looking at production and marketing values for recent years (2005–2008) one has to bear in 
mind the interest rate figure presented earlier in the text, where it is shown that the preferential interest 
rate given by the government has varied in the extent to which it is below the market interest rate, hence 
affecting subsidy levels.  
Moreover, the total AMS support presented in Figure 5 (and Tables 5 and 8) shows that the AMS 
has increased in recent years. Such increase is consequence of two main factors: (1) the cost of income 
support programs (equalization premiums, as shown in Table 8) has increased, and (2) the Brazilian Real 
has increased in value over the U.S. dollar, which resulted in additional increases, visible in Figure 5 for 
the Total Applied AMS before and after de minimis. 
Brazil’s investment in development programs has increased over the last couple years. Such 
programs receive special attention from the government because they are allowed under the WTO rules 
with no ceiling on the amount of subsidies. However, as mentioned above, Brazil includes investment 
programs to commercial farming among its development programs. Figure 6 demonstrates the amount 
that is destined to go to commercial farming and the amount that goes to family farming in investment 
credit programs. 
Figure 6. Investment credit subsidy (in US$ millions) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
Brazil’s overall spending on subsidy programs for family farming presents an interesting trend. It 
is increasing over the years and gaining more importance in the general policy decision making. Figure 7 
for PRONAF total subsidies shows this trend over the years with data gathered from Brazil’s notifications 
to the WTO as well as estimated calculations for the period from 2005 to 2007 and a forecast for 2008. 
From Figure 7 a few conclusions can be drawn: The large share of funds destined to production and 
investment credit programs throughout the years indicates its importance to national agricultural policy, 
and the sharp increase of spending in debt rescheduling poses a level of uncertainty due to its 
questionable status within current WTO regulation.  24 
 


























Source: Brazil’s notifications to the WTO and authors’ calculations.  
4.2. Official and Shadow Notifications for Product-Specific Support 
As far as product-specific analysis goes, this paper focused on a few product of importance for Brazilian 
agriculture: cotton, rice, maize, wheat, soybeans, sugarcane, coffee, and dry beans.  
The data gathered from the Brazilian notifications to the WTO and summarized by product in 
Table 9 allows us to conclude that domestic support for cotton went over the allowed de minimis of 10 
percent of the value of production to 11.5 percent in 1998. Furthermore, from the analysis based on 
government data sources for the estimates and forecasts, the results shown in Table 9 demonstrates that 
the last three years (2006–2008) were either at the level of de minimis or higher (10, 14.3, and 13.7 
percent, respectively). 
It is equally clear that the amount of domestic support given by the government to rice producers 
is higher than the de minimis, at the 18.9 percent level for 1995 and similarly for maize, which in 1995 
saw levels of domestic support reach 11.8 percent. However, for both rice and maize the levels of 
domestic support have fallen in recent years to rates comfortably below the de minimis threshold. 
Additionally, for soybeans, sugarcane, coffee, and beans, the Brazilian government has provided domestic 
support within levels that do not even come close to the allowed level of de minimis. 
Along with the situation observed for cotton, wheat has seen throughout the years levels of 
support that goes beyond the de minimis 10 percent. Within the time period of 10 years (from 1995 to 
2005) three years saw levels above 10 percent (66.8 percent for 1995, 10.1 percent for 1998, and 25.5 
percent for 2005). 
Furthermore, in light of the current Doha Round negotiations, it is interesting to analyze what 
would be the case if the allowed level of de minimis was 6 percent and not the current 10 percent for 
developing countries. If such scenario is played out, one would observe that the situation would be more 
drastic for the group of important products for Brazil. As for cotton, out of the 14 years of available data 
(including estimates and forecasts), Brazil would have gone to levels higher than the allowed de minimis 
in 8 years (1995, 1998, 1999–2001, and 2006–2008, as shown in Table 9). Wheat would also see levels 
above the allowed de minimis for 7 out of the 14 years available (1995, 1996–1998, 2004–2006, and 
2008). Other products such as rice and maize also observed high levels of domestic support in early years 
(for 1995, 18.9 and 11.8 percent, respectively). 25 
 
Table 9. Product-specific support (in US$ millions) and share of the value of production  
        95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04  05(e)  06(e)  07(e)  08(f) 
COTTON 
Prod. & Mark. Credit  12,586  12,710  10,278  19,325  23,830  16,175 19,676 18,695 18,074 15,676 18,049 12,523  9,781  20,897 
Inc.  Sup.  Programs  43,428  41  6  36,099 11,251 39,133 32,430  9,036   -     11,751  84,900  117,255  279,914  317,948 
AMS/VP  8.9% 3.0% 2.4%  11.5%  7.1% 7.9% 6.6% 5.0% 2.1% 1.5% 4.1% 10.0%  14.3%  13.7% 
RICE 
Prod. & Mark. Credit  14,839  34,009  19,058  26,409  49,716  16,984 13,268 14,144 18,349 20,154 29,228 19,060 12,810 30,612 
Inc. Sup. Programs  391,755  12,718  2,677  1,497   -      -      -     126   -      -     16,430  47,435  87,015   -    
AMS/VP  18.9%  2.7% 1.2% 1.4% 2.9% 1.2% 1.0% 1.1% 1.0% 0.8% 2.2%  3.4%  4.3%  1.1% 
MAIZE 
Prod. & Mark. Credit  26,915  73,112  47,232  45,110  82,556  36,867 36,538 39,086 61,180 57,320 91,547 57,746 39,082 93,331 
Inc. Sup. Programs  440,649   -     41,248  2,774  4,233   -     19,796   -     6,174  14,050  27,400  194,300  124,100  4,633 
AMS/VP  11.8%  1.9% 2.5% 1.4% 3.3% 1.1% 2.1% 1.3% 1.5% 1.8% 3.1%  5.5%  2.1%  1.0% 
WHEAT 
Prod. & Mark. Credit  10,677  10,073  14,503  10,300  8,326  7,425  10,325 13,470 22,933 18,663 24,919 16,492 12,476 26,985 
Inc. Sup. Programs  158,392  30,558  11,434  17,096   -      -      -      -     9,863  35,602  107,203  22,080   -      -    
AMS/VP  66.8%  8.2% 8.3%  10.1%  1.5% 1.1% 2.8% 2.8% 4.1% 7.6% 25.5% 8.4%  1.3%  2.4% 
SOYBEAN 
Prod. & Mark. Credit  40,158  59,327  44,650  87,336  133,950  38,481 33,146  44,752  78,203 64,342 93,525 46,902  29,961  91,993 
Inc. Sup. Programs  104,680   -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -     397,576  219,800   -    
AMS/VP 3.7%  1.2%  0.7%  1.6%  3.3%  0.8%  0.5%  0.8%  0.8%  0.6%  1.0%  5.2%  1.9%  0.7% 
SUGAR 
CANE 
Prod. & Mark. Credit  26,226  19,420  16,090  13,877  20,343  3,732 3,421  4,022  7,498 5,719 11,612 14,244 11,558 14,693 
Prod. Cost Equal.   -      -      -     75,272  15,517  45,108  45,221  47,460   -      -      -      -      -      -    
Credit Ethanol 
Storage   -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -     2,814  13,429  8,242   -      -      -    
AMS/VP 0.6%  0.4%  0.3%  1.7%  1.3%  1.3%  1.3%  1.3%  0.3%  0.5%  0.4%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2% 
COFFEE 
Prod. & Mark. Credit  2,102  11,380  9,724  33,535  33,166  14,366 11,665  8,385  11,043  8,370 22,877 26,822 19,064 25,938 
Inc. Sup. Programs   -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -     97,600   -    
AMS/VP 0.1%  0.4%  0.3%  1.0%  1.3%  0.6%  1.0%  0.5%  0.8%  0.3%  0.7%  0.6%  3.0%  0.5% 
BEAN 
Prod. & Mark. Credit  2,978  8,568  4,914  6,699  13,348  3,466  2,357  3,118  4,621  3,907  7,491  5,917  2,205  7,686 
Inc. Sup. Programs   -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -     13,729   -    
AMS/VP 0.2%  0.7%  0.4%  0.4%  1.3%  0.4%  0.3%  0.3%  0.4%  0.4%  0.5%  0.4%  0.8%  0.3% 
Source: Brazil’s notifications to the WTO and authors’ calculations. Note: VP, value of production. 
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5. COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION OF SHADOW NOTIFICATIONS IN RELATION 
TO THE WTO RULES  
The previous two section presented Brazil’s domestic support notifications for years through 2004, 
subsidies estimates for 2005 to 2007, and the forecast for 2008 for the policies as notified in the past by 
the Brazilian government. This section discusses alternative routes that could be used to build the 
notifications by reinterpreting the allocation of programs in the boxes, assuming WTO rules as if Brazil 
were considered a developed country, and setting new commitments resulting from a possible conclusion 
of the Doha Round. 
Before discussing alternative notifications, the low subsidization level of Brazilian policies for 
agriculture allows the country great flexibility to comply with the WTO rules. According to the results 
discussed previously, Brazil has for the most part fallen within its product-specific and non-product-
specific de minimis. In only a few cases was AMS after de minimis positive, and that was for cotton and 
wheat. The reason subsidies for cotton and wheat have in some years exceeded the level of allowed de 
minimis is the income support programs. The situation of cotton in 2006 to 2008 illustrates: In those 
years, the government decided to increase the share of the total production benefited by income support, 
leading to an increase in the level of subsidies. The devaluation of the dollar also contributed to an 
increase in the level of subsidies. The same conclusion would be reached assuming 6 percent value of 
production as a new level for product-specific de minimis. Cotton and wheat would be the only 
comodities to exceed this threshold. 
The following notification alternatives and WTO rules shall be considered for Brazil. 
5.1. Reallocate Investment Subsidies Notified under Article 6.2 to De Minimis 
The reason the government has notified investment subsidies under Article 6.2 is that these are generally 
available for the agricultural sector, as specified in the Article 6.2 provisions. However, for the sake of 
consistency, given that the government decided to separate subsidies for commercial and family farmers, 
the same option should be undertaken for investment subsidies. In terms of meeting the commitments, 
however, shifting investment subsidies to non-product-specific de minimis would not make any 
difference. 
A healthy discussion could be made of the methodology applied to the calculations of investment 
subsidies. The government has opted to calculate interest rate equalization by comparing the investment 
program interest rate with the SELIC rate, which is the short-term market-based interest rate and, 
therefore, is higher than the long-run interest rate. The calculated amount of investment subsidies is, 
therefore, intentionally overstated by the government. Given that the methodology used by the 
government already gives room for Brazil to remain under the non-product-specific de minimis, there 
would be no reason to recalculate the investment subsidies using the long-term interest rate. 
5.2. Recalculate the Notifications, Applying Developed Country Rules to Brazil 
In this scenario, Brazil would not be allowed to use Article 6.2, and de minimis threshold would be 5 
percent of the value of production, rather than 10 percent. The Article 6.2 subsidies would be added to the 
non-product-specific de minimis and compared with the 5 percent de minimis threshold. AMS after de 
minimis would also be recalculated, taking into account the new threshold. The results are presented in 
Table 10. Even in the case of reducing the de minimis threshold, Brazil would be in the position to 
comply with its AMS commitment. Given that amounts in the non-product-specific de minimis and in 
Article 6.2 are well below the 5 percent de minimis threshold, Brazil would find no difficulties in staying 
within the boundaries established by the WTO.27 
 
Table 10. Alternatives subsidy measurement scenarios (in US$ millions) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005(e) 2006(e) 2007(e) 2008(f)
   Current WTO Rules and Brazil as a Developed Country 
AMS  Commitment  1,039  1,025  1,011  997 983 969 954 940 926 912 912 912 912  912 
AMS after 10% De 
Minimis  1,043  0 0  83  0 0 0 0 0 0  132  0  290  339 
AMS after 5% De 
Minimis  1,099  41 33 87 35 55 52  0  0  54  132  875  290 339 
NPS  DM+Article  6.2  377  349  351  478  994  1,132 1,071 1,196 1,564 1,245 1,875 1,780 1,618  2,237 
NPS DM+Article 6.2/ 
Value of Production  0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.8% 2.5% 2.6% 2.8% 3.2% 3.5% 2.3% 3.2% 2.7% 1.9%  2.1% 
                                            
   Doha Round Commitments and Brazil as a Developing Country 
AMS  Commitment  638 638 638 638 638 638 638 638 638 638 638 638 638  638 
AMS after 6% De 
Minimis  1,099  41 33 87 35 55 52  0  0  54  132  168  290 339 
Source: Brazil’s notifications to the WTO and authors’ calculations. Note: NPS is non product specific. 28 
 
5.3. Recalculate the Notifications Assuming New Doha Round Commitments 
According to the Draft Modalities papers in negotiation in 2008 in the context of the Doha Round, new 
commitments for developing countries would be reduced by 30 percent of total AMS and 40 percent of de 
minimis which would reach a new threshold of 6 percent of the value of production. In this scenario, also 
presented in Table 10, AMS after de minimis, with exception of 1995, would be below the new 
commitment of US$638 million.
5 The new de minimis threshold would also not be a constraint for non-
product-specific de minimis even if article 6.2 subsidies were included. 
For the Doha Round results, it is important to assess the role of the overall trade-distorting 
support (OTDS) as a mechanism to impose additional disciplines over the individual cuts (AMS and de 
minimis). In the case of Brazil, the separate cuts have more constraint effect than the reduction in the 
OTDS (Figure 8). This conclusion is due to the fact that Brazil has no blue box policies and will not 
create this type of policy even with the creation of the new blue box. 



























(AMS + 20% De Minimis + 5% BB)
 
Notes: DR Final Commitment (higher): 40 percent cut in AMS and de minimis reduced to 6 percent of value of 
production. DR Final Commitment (lower): 30 percent cut in AMS and de minimis reduced to 6.7 percent. OTDS, 
overall trade-distorting support; BB, blue box; DR, Doha Round; PS, product specific; NPS, non–product specific. 
5.4. Recalculate MPS using total production rather than government procurement 
Although paragraph 8 of Annex 3 of the Agreement is very clear regarding the use of eligible production, 
not necessarily the whole production, in the calculation of MPS, there has been some discussion of the 
economic implications of the legal provisions on this subject. The idea is that the eligible production or 
the quantity available for government procurement, once withdrawn from the market, may impact 
domestic prices, benefiting the whole production or at least the production that will be marketed after the 
government intervention.  
As discussed in Section 2, government procurement policies in Brazil are implemented through 
two mechanisms: AGF and COA. As presented in Table 1, from 2004 to 2008, AGF was almost 
negligible in terms of purchased volumes. COA, however, was important mainly for rice. The market 
                                                      
5 As mentioned in previous sections, we have reached different calculations for the AMS in 1995 when compared with the 
notifications. For reasons that are unknown to the authors, wheat subsidies were not included in the AMS after de minimis. 
According to our calculations, wheat total subsidies in 1995 have exceeded the de minimis level and should have been included in 
the total AMS. 29 
 
situation for rice in Brazil in 2004–2005 and 2006–2007 confirms that although the COA benefits are 
only a share of the total production, the program is able to affect prices. Government procurement for the 
2004–2005 and 2006–2007 farming seasons was 7 percent and 8 percent, respectively, of the total 
production (Table 1), and in both seasons prices responded positively to government intervention. 
However, higher prices did not necessarily benefit the whole production of rice. Two reasons explain this: 
(1) Government procurement in both years took place during the marketing season and it is very difficult 
to capture the share of the production that was already sold by the time the intervention started. (2) 
Government procurement in Brazil does occur as direct purchases but through a put option system 
(COA). The producer buys a put option, which gives him the right to sell the production to the 
government at a certain future date at a fixed price. With this put option, the producer tends to keep the 
contracted production in storages during the lifetime of the option (six months in general), and 
consequently, prices will tend to rise. That also depends on the market situation; for example, if prices 
increase above the level of the put option execution price, then producers may sell the production in 
advance, and give up the option. This system of options contracts, which is the predominant mechanism 
used by the government to procure product, may affect the future prices within the crop season but may 
not affect prices of future seasons. 
A key distinction between the Brazilian MPS and the ones applied in developed countries, which 
are based on border protection and therefore affect the whole production, is that AGF and COA are after-
harvesting policies. Before planting, the producer is informed of the level of minimum prices, which is 
the reference price for the implementation of policies; however, the amount of production enrolled in the 
program is defined by the government in the marketing period of the season. Despite the fact that 
minimum prices are established in the regulations, there is no provision regarding volumes of government 
procurement. The way the COA is operated, therefore, minimizes distorting signals that the program may 
send for producers in terms of stimulating overproduction. 
5.5. Alternative Approaches to Notify the Debt Rescheduling Programs 
The level of indebtedness and the capacity of farmers to honor the payment of loans have been major 
constraints for the performance of Brazilian agriculture. In order to eliminate these constraints, the 
government promoted a renegotiation of the debts with conditions of interest rate and payment period 
favorable in relation to the conditions offered at the original loans. As discussed earlier in the paper, many 
programs were renegotiated during 1995 and 1998. The majority of the renegotiated debts were acquired 
during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
The equivalent level of subsidies for the debt rescheduling program was calculated comparing the 
cost of the original loan with the cost of the rescheduled loan. Given that the negotiated payment period 
for each program was different, the methodology used included measuring the subsidization as the 
difference of the present value (December 2002 as a basis) of the original and rescheduled loans.
6 The 
level of subsidization calculated for 2002 was divided by the lifetime of the rescheduled loan, and then 
notified yearly. The annual value was corrected for inflation and the corresponding exchange rates. 
Therefore, it is our view that the methodology used by the government falls within the guidelines of the 
WTO rules. By 2002, the balance of debts under renegotiation was valuated at R$29.2 billion (US$10 
billion), which corresponded to 84 percent of the total balance of debts. 
                                                      
6 With the exception of the work done by OECD (2005), there is no public document available explaining the methodologies 
used by the different government agencies involved in the calculation of the subsidy component of the debt rescheduling 
programs. The lack of information, however, is more due to the complexity associated with putting together all credit programs in 
place in Brazil, which involves not only official banks such as Banco do Brasil and BNDES but also private banks, than lack of 
transparency from the government. All information presented in this paper was collected through interviews with technical 
professionals involved with the topic. Although the authors were able to gather from personal interviews and contacts almost all 
information needed to update data up to 2008, we are of the view that the government should make the effort to be transparent in 
disclosing information on the debit renegotiation programs. Those programs are becoming increasingly important, especially with 
the new program put in place in September of 2008, which further justifies increasing levels of transparency. 30 
 
The implementation of the rescheduling program has shown that many farmers were not capable 
of continuing to make all annual payments, and that only part of the rescheduled loans had been 
liquidated. Due to the fact that a share of the annual installments had not been paid by farmers, the 
government promoted changes in the debt rescheduling policies, prolonging the length of the loans and 
reducing interest rates. This consequently leads to a higher level of subsidization. Notifications from 1999 
to 2002 were able to capture those changes. However, 2003 and 2004 notifications assumed zero default 
on the annual payments. In other worlds, the subsidy associated to unpaid debts in the debt rescheduling 
programs is captured only when a new program is launched. This is a consequence of the methodology 
adopted by government which measures the level of subsidization through the interest rate differential. 
That methodology is not capturing the benefits for producers that were not able to pay the annual 
installments. 
An alternative way to capture the subsidy equivalent related to unpaid installments is to associate 
them to an opportunity cost. The unpaid amount has an opportunity cost that is appropriated by the in debt 
producers. The value of this opportunity cost could be added up in the notified value, according to the 
amount of unpaid installments. Unfortunately, the government does not make available to the public the 
records of the balance of payments already paid. 
As discussed earlier, the main objective of the rescheduling program was to allow farmers to 
recover financial solvency and maintain their access to credit in order to finance working capital and 
marketing costs. The production expansion of early 2000 followed the increasing availability of credit 
observed in the same period. Additionally, in this period the government created some credit programs for 
investments, leading farmers to increase the level of indebtedness even further. The balance of credit in 
2007 was nearly double that of 2002: In 2002 it was 32 percent of the value of production, and it reached 
61 percent in 2007. 
Farmers’ income, however, has not had the expected performance and solvency of producers, in 
particular for the state of Mato Grosso, is compromised. Thus, the farm sector and the government 
negotiated the 2008 new rural debt management policy of the Debt Liquidation and Compliance Program.  
Total debt balance under negotiation is estimated to be in R$74.4 billion (US$38.2 billion). The 
equivalent subsidization will depend on the parameters negotiated under the new rescheduling program. 
Sources from the government have indicated that the additional subsidies, at 2007 value, would be around 
R$10 billion (US$5.7 billion). Assuming a lifetime of the rescheduled debt of 15 years, this amount 
would imply, at 2007 value, US$380 million in addition to the notified value in 2008 (US$1.4 billion). 
Given the different nature of the recent released Debt Liquidation and Compliance Program in 
comparison with the earlier debt rescheduling program, new methodologies must be developed in order to 
update the notifications from 2008 onward. An update is also necessary to evaluate the impact of unpaid 
payments from 2004 in the subsidy component of the debt rescheduling program. In other words, 
estimations presented in this paper until 2008 are underestimated because the unpaid payments are not 
included in the calculations. 
To search for alternative ways to replicate the notifications of the debt rescheduling program, as 
well as suggest improvement in the methodology for the future notifications that will take account the 
2008 Debt Liquidation and Compliance Program, two possibilities can be explored: 
1.  The first is the idea pursued and later abandoned by the OECD, which was to calculate the 
Brazilian producer support equivalent, assuming that 100 percent of the subsidy should be 
notified in one installment. That option would put Brazil in a delicate position because the 
present value of the subsidy in 2002 would come up to US$9.5 billion, which is much 
greater than the US$3.7 billion non-product-specific de minimis threshold. 
2.  A second possibility is to recalculate the annual payments, assuming a schedule that follows 
a financial cash flow similar to a mortgage loan. With this methodology, interest is front-
loaded, while the principal is divided equally in the schedule of payments, increasing the 
initial payments and reducing the final payments.  
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To examine option 2 for the past debt renegotiations, the notified values were recalculated from 
1999 to 2008, assuming a 15-year payment period. From the total of 15 payments, which is equivalent to 
principal payments of 6.67 percent per payment in equal installments, the first payment  moved up to 8.5 
percent out of 100 percent of the total payments and the last payment moved down to 4.5 percent. As can 
be seen in Figure 9, the calculation based on distribution of the subsidy component over time using front-
loaded interest payments shows results very similar to the methodology used in the notifications. The 
short-term period of payments, 15 years, explains why results are so similar. 
Even when one assumes that the government is using the best methodology available to notify the 
debt rescheduling program, the economic impacts of this program are not captured by the notifications. It 
is clear that Brazilian farmers respond with increased production when the solvency problem is solved. A 
new rescheduling program will, therefore, stimulate new investments and push production up. Brazilian 
policymakers should pay more attention to this evidence when negotiating the new rescheduling program 
in order to avoid an adverse consequence: stimulating farmers to act as risk takers and to overinvest in 
agricultural production. This is essentially a domestic policy consideration as long as Brazil is within its 
WTO commitment in terms of the debt rescheduling program. 















Source: Brazil’s notifications to the WTO; interviews with technical people from the federal government, and authors’ 
calculations. 
5.6. The Use of Budgetary Outlays Rather Than the Opportunity Cost Approach 
Credit subsidies are notified using the opportunity cost approach: Preferential interest rates are compared 
with market interest rates in order to calculate subsidy levels. For a few sources of funding, the 
preferential rate is even lower than the cost of the resource, and the government uses budgetary resources 
to make up the difference (in Brazil, this operation is called interest rate equalization). This is the case of 
a few PRONAF credit modalities. In addition, the government also may cover BACEN’s fixed costs to 
operate PRONAF contracts. Although this is not a direct subsidy to the farmer, it also accounts as a 
budgetary expense. In the case of PRONAF, therefore, an alternative methodology is to notify budgetary 
expenses rather than the interest rate differential. In 2006, for example, the estimated notified value was 
US$357.1 million (production and investment credit), and it would be US$499 million under the 
budgetary expense approach. Although the subsidy increases, given that PRONAF is notified under 
Article 6.2 a change in the methodology would not affect Brazil’s WTO compliance.32 
6.  PROJECTED NOTIFICATIONS THROUGH 2018 
Notified data from 1995 to 2004 and estimated and forecast data up to 2008 show that there are two 
groups of programs that should be monitored in future notifications: income support programs and debt 
management programs. With respect to the latter, and due to reasons discussed in Section 2.5, this paper 
does not provide any projections, despite the fact that with the creation of the debt liquidation and 
compliance program, Brazil will use more space for these subsidies within its non-product-specific de 
minimis. The largest share of the non-product-specific de minimis used was 2.3 percent of the production 
value in 2003, out of a threshold of 10 percent. Even without explicit projections, we can expect that the 
new debt management policies will fit within the non-product-specific de minimis. Projections analyzed 
in this section will therefore be focused on product-specific income support programs. 
From the set of products subjected to income support programs presented in Table 9, cotton, rice, 
maize, and wheat were subjected to amber box subsidies higher than the de minimis clause at least once 
from 1995 to 2008. Although for rice and maize the de minimis was breached only once, for cotton and 
wheat this happened three times. Assuming a 6 percent of production value de minimis, cotton and wheat 
went over their ceilings by 8 and 7 times, respectively. The higher relevance of income support policies 
for cotton and wheat, relative to other products, can also be observed in Table 1: In 2008, 64 percent of 
cotton production was subject to equalization premium mechanisms. 
As can be seen, cotton is a special case among the crops granted with product-specific support 
mechanisms. The increasing support for cotton is explained by different reasons. The continuous 
overvaluation of the Brazilian currency since 2004 has reduced the competitiveness of the Brazilian 
cotton production facing domestic prices determined by world prices. The level of competitiveness is also 
strongly affected by transportation costs. There are two main cotton-producing regions in Brazil: the state 
of Mato Grosso in the midwest cerrados, and the state of Bahia in the northeast cerrados. Together they 
are responsible for 80 percent of the total production. Both regions are not endowed with good 
transportation infrastructure, forcing prices to be lower and costs higher. In the medium-run, with the 
extension of the South-North Railway under the federal government’s growth acceleration program 
(PAC—Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento), transportation costs in Bahia should drop, benefiting 
producers. The perspective for Mato Grosso, however, is not as promising. In the short-run, the 
devaluation of the Real with the 2008 world financial crisis will certainly help the producers, although the 
financial crisis itself will be detrimental to cotton demand. 
The projected notification results for 2009–2018 are presented in Table 11. The two main 
product-specific programs were projected: credit for cropping activities and marketing loans; and income 
support programs, assuming that only equalization premium instruments will be used in the future. 
The production and marketing credit subsidy was calculated assuming that in the future the 
proportion between the equivalent subsidy for credit and the value of production will be constant. An 
average from 2005 to 2008 was calculated, and that was extrapolated for future years. Value of 
production was calculated using the production and prices contained in the FAPRI’s 2008 Outlook 
(FAPRI 2008). 
Given that FAPRI’s 2008 Outlook has production for Brazil but does not have Brazilian prices, 
available prices were used as a reference to calculate domestic prices in Brazil. The basic assumption is 
that domestic prices will follow the same trend of world prices, using exchange rates also collected from 
FAPRI’s 2008 Outlook. The following prices were used: Cotlook A Index for cotton, and U.S. FOB Gulf 
Ports for rice, corn, and wheat. Given that FAPRI’s 2008 Outlook prices are given in real terms, 
minimum prices in Brazil were kept constant at the 2008 nominal level. The unitary subsidy is calculated 
by the difference between the estimated domestic price based on world prices and the minimum price 
supported by the government, when the latter is above the former.  
As discussed, the decision of the amount of production to be subjected to the equalization 
premium program is ex-post (after the harvest) and varies according to the year and to the objectives of 
the government in terms of income support. It was assumed fixed for the projection period at the same 33 
amount as the highest share between the benefited volume and the production observed from 2005 to 
2008. The shares used are 64 percent for cotton, 10 for rice, 20 for corn and 20 for wheat. 
Projections indicated that the total support for cotton and wheat will fluctuate around 4 to 6 
percent of the projected value of production. With a product-specific de minimis of 10 percent of 
production value, it is not expected that cotton and wheat will breach above the allowed ceiling. However, 
if the de minimis is reduced to 6 percent, cotton would go above the allowed ceiling six times from 2009 
to 2018. 
Table 11. Projections of product-specific support for most sensitive commodities (in US$ millions) 
        09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
COTTO
N 
Prod. & Mark. 
Credit  18,394 18,669 19,184 19,537 19,638 19,600 19,683 19,818 19,912 20,197 
Inc. Sup. 














AMS/VP  3.9% 4.6% 4.6% 5.2% 6.2% 6.7% 6.4% 6.0% 5.9% 6.0% 
RICE 
Prod. & Mark. 
Credit  36,550 36,210 35,267 35,297 35,317 34,785 34,042 33,373 32,667 32,847 
Inc. Sup. 
Programs  - - - - - - - - - - 
AMS/VP  1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 
MAIZE 























Programs  - -  23,351  7,875  - - - - - - 
AMS/VP  1.3% 1.3% 1.5% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 
WHEA
T 
Prod. & Mark. 
Credit  20,079 17,290 16,085 15,761 15,481 15,298 14,980 14,668 14,310 14,154 
Inc. Sup. 
Programs  19,186 18,205 17,749 15,917 14,501 11,978 10,749  9,554  8,757  8,136 
AMS/VP  5.7% 5.9% 6.1% 5.8% 5.6% 5.2% 5.0% 4.8% 4.7% 4.6% 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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7.  ETHANOL POLICIES AND THE WTO RULES 
The recognition that biofuels policies have contributed to the rise in agricultural commodities prices 
observed during 2007 and 2008 is encouraging the debate concerning the distortive effects of these 
policies. If biofuels policies induce distortions on the world market of agricultural products, why not fit 
them in the WTO framework disciplines? Why not notify them as any other agricultural domestic 
support? Although these questions seem to be rational and logical, answers are not that straightforward. 
New questions arise regarding the idea of notifying biofuels domestic policies: (1) Are they targeted for 
agricultural products? (2) Who is the final beneficiary: farmers, blenders, consumers? (3) Are they 
available only for the domestically produced biofuels? (4) Given that biofuels trade is not liberalized, are 
domestic policies discriminatory against imported biofuels? (5) What policies should be notified: tax 
credits/tax exemption and blending mandates?  
These questions are relevant. From an economic perspective, biofuels policies have real impacts 
on the world market of agricultural products, and as a consequence, they should be subjected to 
multilateral disciplines. However, from a legal perspective, the idea of notifying them in the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture framework can be refuted with different arguments. For example, one could 
argue that biofuels policies are not mainly distorting the biofuels market, but instead the agricultural 
commodities market.  
The two most important biofuels policies that are source of distortions are tax exemption/tax 
credit and mandates. Following de Gorter and Just (2008) arguments, in a presence of a blending 
mandate, tax credit policies become a source of subsidy. One approach would be to focus on the mandate 
itself as a policy affecting prices. An alternative would be to notify the revenue forgone by the 
government with tax credit/exemption policies. This approach, however, has some limitations. The tax 
exemption for ethanol in Brazil is around US$0.40 per gallon (R$0.18 per liter). However, in 2007 it was 
US$0.62 per gallon (R$0.28 per liter). The comparison of per-unit values would show that Brazil is 
subsidizing the sugarcane ethanol industry more than the United States is the corn ethanol industry. This 
was true in 2007 because the federal tax credit in the United States was US$0.51 per gallon. If we change 
the perspective of the economic impacts of both policies on the world price of agricultural commodities, it 
is hard to say that Brazil is distorting the world market to the same extent as the United States. Besides 
that, ethanol is a gasoline additive in the United States and, as a fuel, a gasoline competitor in Brazil. The 
nature of the policies is very similar, but its economic impacts are not. 
A second problem of tax credit/exemption policies is that although they are not necessarily 
discriminatory against imported biofuels, under the presence of border protection, they are. If there would 
be no tariffs blocking the ethanol trade, ethanol from different origins would be enjoying similar benefits 
in countries that adopted tax credit policies. Although a free market would not resolve the issue of 
subsidizing oil consumption (de Gorter and Just 2008), at least the allocation of biofuel production among 
regions would be more efficient. 
A second possible methodology for ethanol policies would be through the MPS calculations. 
With tax credits, we can expect higher prices of ethanol, which could be converted into the price of the 
agricultural feedstock and compared with world reference prices. The advantage of using this 
methodology is that it might also include border protection effects. The MPS method should be assessed 
in conjunction with the revenue-forgone methodology, in order to avoid doubly counting the subsidies. 
Overview of Brazilian Policies for Ethanol 
This section is focused only on ethanol policies because, although the biodiesel market has been 
stimulated by a set of policies very similar to those that apply to ethanol, biodiesel consumption is very 
small in Brazil compared with ethanol consumption. 
Brazilian policies for ethanol comprise the following instruments: 
1.  Twenty to 25 percent mandatory blend of anhydrous ethanol in gasoline A (pure gasoline). 
The gasoline blended with ethanol and sold at the pump is called gasoline C. Gasoline A is 35 
supplied by Petrobras (Brazilian oil company) to distributors (oil companies like Shell, 
Esso/Exxon, etc.), which in turn will blend the ethanol and distribute the gasoline C to gas 
stations. 
2.  Tax exemption of Contribution to Intervention in the Economic Dominion (CIDE). The 
CIDE fee is set at R$0.18/liter (~US$0.09/liter). Both anhydrous and hydrous ethanol (E100 
ethanol) are exempted. If it had to be paid, CIDE on ethanol would be collected by millers. 
On gasoline A, CIDE is collected by Petrobras before it is sold to distributors. 
3.  Differential levy on the state tax (ICMS). In some states, like Sao Paulo, the ICMS fee for 
hydrous ethanol (12 percent) is lower than for gasoline (25 percent). However, given that 
ICMS is collected by gas stations, anhydrous ethanol is taxed by 25 percent as gasoline C. 
In other states, however, the ICMS fee is the same for gasoline and hydrous ethanol. 
4.  Subsidized credit for ethanol storage (preferential rates). This program had been notified in 
the last two notifications and classified as a sugarcane subsidy. 
5.  Vehicles: partial exemption of the IPI (tax on industrialized products) on flex-fuel cars as 
follows: 
a. Below 1-liter engines: 7 percent fee on gasoline, E100 and flex-fuel cars 
b. Between 1- and 2-liter engines: 13 percent fee on gasoline cars and 11 percent on E100 
and flex-fuel cars 
c. Above 2-liter engines: 25 percent fee on gasoline cars and 18 percent fee on E100 and 
flex-fuel cars 
With regard to policies that are oriented to stimulate ethanol consumption and to grant 
competitiveness for ethanol in relation to gasoline, mandate and tax exemption of CIDE are the two most 
important. 
The mandate in Brazil is binding the consumption of anhydrous ethanol, which follows the 
consumption of gasoline. However, the consumption growth of ethanol in Brazil is taking place with 
hydrous ethanol. For the 2007–2008 season, it is expected that the Center-South region will produce 19.3 
billion liters of ethanol: 7.2 billion liters of anhydrous and 12.1 billion liters of hydrous. With the 
expansion of flex-fuel car sales in Brazil since 2003, when the first model was launched, the anhydrous 
market has been stable, while the hydrous market is growing very fast. The mandate in Brazil, therefore, 
has a very different role from the mandate in the United States or in the European countries in terms of 
subsidizing the production of ethanol. 
A second distinction concerns price levels. Contrary to the situation in the United States and 
Europe, ethanol prices in Brazil are lower than gasoline prices (see Table 12). Even if ethanol was not 
exempt from CIDE, prices would still be lower. The CIDE exemption, therefore, is not necessarily acting 
as a consumption stimulator but as mechanism to guarantee higher margins to the millers. Additionally, 
given that hydrous ethanol is a competitor of gasoline and its consumption is increasing much faster than 
gasoline, the CIDE exemption is not subsidizing gasoline consumption as would be the case of anhydrous 
ethanol.  
This particular situation in Brazil makes it even more difficult to find a common methodology to 
notify biofuels subsidies in the WTO for agricultural products. 36 
Table 12. Prices of gasoline A, anhydrous ethanol, and hydrous ethanol (R$/liter) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Gasoline A  0.99 1.24 1.30 1.45 1.54 1.54 
Anhydrous Ethanol  0.62 0.81 0.70 0.87 1.03 0.83 
Hydrous Ethanol  0.54 0.69 0.60 0.77 0.93 0.74 
Source: CEPEA. 
Notes: 
1. Including contributions for the Social Integration Program (PIS) and for the Financing of Social Security (COFINS  and 
excluding Tax on Goods and Services (ICMS). Ethanol is exempt from R$0.18/liter of CIDE. 
2. Gasoline A: Petrobras selling price to the distributors. Source: Agencia Nacional de Petroleo (ANP). 
3. Anhydrous and hydrous ethanol: average state of Sao Paulo millers selling prices 
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8.  CONCLUSIONS 
Brazil is presenting itself as being in a comfortable position with respect to domestic support in the Doha 
Round negotiations, and our analysis confirms this position. Doha Round outcomes in terms of creating 
or strengthening domestic support disciplines will not be a constraint for the execution of the Brazilian 
agricultural policy. Even in the most restrictive scenario, assuming Brazil as a developed country, Brazil 
would still have enough room for maneuver by using non-product-specific and product-specific de 
minimis to notify its programs. In the case of Brazil, de minimis policies are binding compared to the 
OTDS of a possible Doha agreement. Due to the high level of overhang, even in the product-specific de 
minimis, a 40 percent reduction will not oblige Brazil to make deep changes in its programs. 
Nevertheless, Brazil must be careful with income support programs. They have been responsible 
for product-specific support exceeding the de minimis levels. Income support programs, however, can be 
controlled by the government in order to fit them into allowed levels of de minimis. 
The debt management programs, although they do not raise concerns with respect to how to 
notify them, are capable of influencing farmers’ decisions in the medium to long run. They are becoming 
more sophisticated, with different sets of programs and specific objectives, and their relevance on the 
domestic support notifications will increase in the future. They have a risk aversion reduction effect and 
may lead farmers to overinvest in agricultural production. Although the debt rescheduling program is not 
product specific and is decoupled from the current production, the successive renegotiations have 
indicated to farmers that they do not need to be risk averse in getting credit because debts will be 
renegotiated at some point in the future. This effect is similar to the update effect of the U.S. direct 
payments. In Brazil’s case, the certainty about the future renegotiation is leading farmers to high levels of 
indebtedness. There are no empirical studies assessing this hypothesis, but the release of 2006 agricultural 
census data will help us to evaluate the consequences of the debt relief policy. 
In the process of negotiating the recent debt liquidation and compliance law, the government 
decided to be more transparent in releasing data on the level of indebtedness, but lack of transparency 
remains a problem to be tackled. This lack of transparency is not so much with respect to methodology 
used for measuring subsidy components, but with respect to making data on rescheduling and 
management programs publicly available. 
As for biofuels, there is no doubt that disciplines are needed at the multilateral level. New rules 
are necessary to guarantee that policies oriented to create demand for biofuels will not jeopardize world 
agricultural markets. WTO rules, however, must be improved in order to capture the specific situations of 
biofuels, which are not the same as other agricultural commodities. 38 
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